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The Pennsylvania Right to Know Statute:
A Creature of the Legislature Shaped
by the Judiciary
I. Introduction
The public's right to know is of paramount importance to a demo-
cratic society.' The right has been asserted so ineffectively, however, that
government officials have had little difficulty in performing their public
duties in seclusion from the public eye.2 Consequently, public interest in
the functions of government has diminished. 3 In recognition of the grow-
ing need for open government, state legislatures4 and Congress 5 have
I. James Madison noted during the Constitutional Convention that "[k]nowledge will
forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm
themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular infor-
mation or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps
both." 3 LETrERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 276 (1865) (letter to W.T.
Barry, August 4, 1822).
2. See generally Comment, Where's the Sunshine? Inadequacy of Pennsylvania's
Open Meeting Law, 82 DICK. L. REV. 719 (1978).
3. Access to public records is necessary for a knowledgeable electorate. See, e.g.,
Wiles v. Armstrong School Dist., 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 499 (C.P. Armstr. 1974). The voter
turnout in the latest state-wide election, however, suggests a more alarming possibility-the
voluntary dissolution of the electorate. See 1974-75 PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL 625-26 (64% of
those registered to vote in the 1974 Pennsylvania gubernatorial election actually voted).
Therefore, any obstacle hindering citizen participation in government affairs should be
eliminated.
4. Forty-seven states have enacted statutes granting the public the right to inspect
public records. ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 145 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.110 (1977); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 39-121 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (Supp. 1977); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 6253
(West Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-203 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19
(West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 10001 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011
(West 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2701 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 92-50 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO
CODE § 9-301 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.103a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-1-3 (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.1 (West 1973); KAN. STAT. § 45-
201 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.650 (Baldwin 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
44:31 (West 1951); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1, § 408 (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 2
(1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
4.1801(1) (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.17 (West 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.015 (Vernon
Supp. 1977); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-512 (1970); NEE. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (1971);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.010 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 47: 1A-2 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-5-I (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Pun. OFF.
LAW § 84 (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-
04-18 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Baldwin 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
51, § 24 (West 1962); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.410(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1 (Purdon
1959 & Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 1-20.2 (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-27-1
(Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-304 (1973); TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 17 1/2, § 6252-17a
(Vernon Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-26-2 (1977); VA. CODE § 2.1-342 (Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.04.100 (1972); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-1 (Supp. 1977); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 19.21(2) (West 1972); Wyo. STAT. § 9-692.1 (Supp. 1975).
5. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1970). For a thorough analysis of
enacted a wide variety of "freedom of information" statutes that reveal
legislators' belief that the public's right to know is not unlimited.
6
Because the right of access to government documents must be balanced
against the sovereign's legitimate need for secrecy, most "freedom of
information" statutes permit the judiciary to balance the countervailing
interests in a case-by-case analysis.
7
The balancing approach employed in many jurisdictions, however,
presents the possibility of uncertain application. For this reason Pennsyl-
vania has rejected the balancing approach in favor of a definitional
"Right to Know" statute.8 Notwithstanding the legislative attempt at
certainty, express definitions of the terms "agency" and "public record"
have been subjected to varying judicial interpretations in an often unsuc-
cessful effort to construe properly the true legislative intent. Although the
judicial construction of Pennsylvania's "Right to Know" statute is inade-
quate in many cases, it still expands the right of access to public records
beyond that existing at common law9 and under the state constitution. ' 0
II. The Pennsylvania Need for a Right to Know Statute
Before the "Right to Know" statute was enacted, access to public
records was considered more a privilege than a right. II The common law
limited access to public records by imposing requirements of "special
interest" and "peculiar injury." Moreover, constitutional protection was
virtually nonexistent. 12 Consequently, few inspections of public records
were permitted by either agencies or courts. 13
the Act, see Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761
(1967).
6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 145 (1958);ARIz. REV. STAT. § 39-121(1974); IDAHO
CODE § 9-301 (1948).
7. The CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 6255 (West Supp. 1977) provides that "[tihe agency shall
justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record. . . is exempt . . . or that
on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not making the record public
clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record." Power to weigh
the applicable interests involved in each case is expressly granted to California courts.
Kernick v. Jones, 113 Pitts. L.J. 546 (Pa. C.P. 1965), states the competing government
and public interests: "On the one hand ... a government which exists through the will of
the people cannot conduct its important affairs in secret, and on the other hand . . [a]
government could hardly be conducted at all if large numbers of persons elected to exercise
the privilege of scrutinizing the . . . government." Id. at 547.
8. PA. STAT. AtNN. tit. 65, § 66.1 (Purdon 1959).
9. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text infra.
10. PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (records of all the Board of Pardons arc open for public
inspection).
11. See, e.g., Owens & Short v. Woolridge, 8 Pa. D. 305 (C.P. Clear. 1899).
12. See notes 18-25 and accompanying text infra.
13. Several state statutes and one constitutional provision did facilitate public inspec-
tion of records. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-10 (Purdon 1965) (application for
marriage licenses and consent certificates filed with thi clerk are public records open to
public inspection).
For the most part, access to records that were statutorily declared public was limited to
taxpayers. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5452.18 (Purdon 1968). Moreover, the types of
records deemed accessible were usually not essential to the performance of essential
government functions and, therefore, were inadequate to safeguard the public interest. See,
A. Common-Law Inadequacies
Access to public records under Pennsylvania common law depended
upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the party seeking access must
have demonstrated a "special interest" and the party must have suffered
a "peculiar injury" to permit the court to issue a writ of mandamus.
14
After some initial confusion about the "special interest" requirement,' 5
courts asserted that this requirement could be fulfilled only by proof that
the party seeking access had an interest in the records apart from that
shared by the general public.' 6 To maintain a mandamus action, more-
over, an individual must either plead and prove a "special injury" or
convince the Attorney General or district attorney to institute an action on
the theory that the ministerial duty sought to be enforced was public.' 7
B. Constitutional Inadequacies
Many commentators insist that the right to inspect public records is
guaranteed by the first amendment of the federal constitution.' 8 Most
have predicated their assertions upon historical analyses. t9 With the
exception of dicta in several cases, 20 however, courts have never express-
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 125 (Purdon 1968) (records of the State Dental Council are
open to public inspection).
14. The writ of mandamus was the sole remedial device in Pennsylvania that required
public officials to permit public access to records. Clark v. Meade, 369 Pa. 409, 85 A.2d 169
(1952). The writ could compel the performance of only ministerial or mandatory acts that the
law required certain officers to perform. The petitioning party, however, could only enforce
a specific legal right. For a more detailed analysis of the writ of mandamus, see 23 P.L.E.
MANDAMUS §§ 1-11 (1959).
15. The common law of various jurisdictions had developed three independent
theories to govern the public's right to inspect records: (I) the right was absolute absent
sufficient reason to the contrary, e.g., Butcher v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Philadelphia, 163
Pa. Super. Ct. 343, 61 A.2d 367 (1948); (2) the right accrued only to a party with a "special
interest," e.g., In re Simon, 353 Pa. 514, 46 A.2d 243 (1946); and (3) the right was
determined by a balancing process in which the benefit of inspection was weighed against
ensuing probable harm, e.g., State exrel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d
470 (1965), modified on other grounds and rehearing denied, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 139 N.W.2d 241
(1966).
16. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Milliken v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 23 Pa. D.
424 (C.P. Phila. 1914); Owens & Short v. Woolridge, 8 Pa. D. 305 (C.P. Clear. 1899).
17. Dorris v. Lloyd, 375 Pa. 474, 100 A.2d 924 (1954).
18. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. REV.
1; Renning, The People's Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.L.J. 667 (1959); Note, The Public's Right
of Access to Government Information Under the First Amendment, 51 CHi.-KETr L. REV.
164 (1974).
U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
19. Senator Thomas C. Henning declared,
When the original Constitution came to be written, no explicit provision was
made concerning the people's 'right to know.' The explanation for this seems to be
that the right to know, like many other fundamental rights, was taken so much for
granted that it was deemed unnecessary to include it.
Renning, The Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.L.J. 667, 668 (1959) (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., Mandell v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub. nom. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
ly granted the right to inspect public records constitutional status. 21 In
fact, the present thrust of court decisions indicates that there is no
"unrestrained right to gather information."
22
The Pennsylvania Constitution23 affords no more protection to the
public's right to know than does the first amendment of the federal
constitution. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adhered to the
direction supplied by federal courts. In McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 24 for
example, the court declared that the right to inspect is not protected by
either the federal or state constitutions and affirmed the denial of a request
by a local newspaper for access to a list containing the names of welfare
recipients. 25 The Pennsylvania "Right to Know" statute, therefore, was
enacted to accord citizens a statutory right to inspect public records in lieu
of a constitutional right that state courts were unwilling to concede
existed.
III. The Pennsylvania Right to Know
The "Right to Know" statute, enacted by the General Assembly in
1957, provides the "exclusive remedy for a person denied his request for
examination and inspection of public records ...... 26 The primary
motive for the enactment of the statute was public outrage resulting from
publicized abuses by certain governmental officials. 27 Moreover, the
legislature desired to eliminate confusion caused and restrictions imposed
by common-law requirements 28 and to grant the "right of exami-
nation and inspection of public records . . . regardless of . . . inter-
est. "29 The legislature intended to achieve these purposes by conferring
21. In United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 444
F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the district court stated that
the "press must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the even greater
values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to know. " Id. at 331 (emphasis
added). Despite this statement, however, the case was ultimately decided on the propriety
of issuing injunctions to effect "prior restraints" upon the press. Implicit in the course of
this and similar decisions, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), is the
judicial hesitancy to hold that the right to know is constitutionally protected and the judicial
preference for permitting access to public records as a correlative to an established constitu-
tional right. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 25 U.S. 748 (1976).
22. See, e.g., Pell v. Procurier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
23. PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
24. 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973).
25. See also McLaughlin v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 465 Pa. 104, 348 A.2d 376
(1975) (newspaper was denied access to judicial records of an attorney disbarment proceed-
ing despite the contention that the right of access was constitutionally protected).
26. Kernick v. Jones, 113 Pitts. L.J. 546, 547 (Pa. C.P. 1965) (citing Wiley v. Woods,
393 Pa. 341, 141 A.2d 844 (1958)).
27. See generally Brief for Appellee at 16, Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 141 A.2d 844
(1958).
28. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
29. Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 350, 141 A.2d 844, 849 (1958). See also Yeager
Unemployment Compensation Case, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 162, 171, 173 A.2d 802, 807 (1961);
Kegel v. Community College, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 220, 226 (C.P. Beaver 1972).
The statute permits inspection of records at least to the extent provided by common
standing upon "any citizen. "30
To further promote the interests of open government, the legislature
contemporaneously enacted an "Open Meeting" statute, 3' which was
later expanded by the "Sunshine" law.
32 Both acts are in pari materia33
with the "Right to Know" statute and comprise "a series of legislative
enactments designed to provide a comprehensive format governing public
access . . , ' "3" Therefore, when the lack of precedent makes it difficult
to construe sections of the "Right to Know" statute, judicial construc-
tions of the "Open Meeting" statute and "Sunshine" law should prove
instructive 35
The "Right to Know" statute should be liberally construed36 to
permit disclosure of public records to Commonwealth "citizens" regard-
less of their interests or reasons for inspection. 37 The implementation of
this policy favoring disclosure should focus upon the clear language
contained in the definitions of the statute and should not require indepen-
dent evaluation of governmental and public interests.38 Despite the clear
legislative intent and definitional provisions of the statute, much about
law. Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 448 Pa. 424, 429 n. 10,292 A.2d 395, 398 n. 10
(1972).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.2 (Purdon 1959). The legislature limited the right to
inspect by qualifying the definition of "public record" with exceptions that protect the
legitimate needs for governmental secrecy. See notes 108-158 and accompanying text infra.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 251 (Purdon 1959).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Purdon Supp. 1977). Appeal of Emanuel Baptist
Church, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 364 A.2d 536 (1976) ("Sunshine" law expands the "Open
Meeting" statute). For a complete analysis of the "Sunshine" law, see Comment, Where's
the Sunshine? Inadequacy of Pennsylvania's Open Meeting Law, 82 DICK. L. REV. 719
(1978).
33. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1932(a) (Purdon 1977), defines in pan materia as
"[sitatutes or parts of statutes . . . [which] . . . relate to the same persons or things or the
same class of persons or things." When statutes are in pan materia, they "shall be
construed together, if possible, as one statute." Id. § 1932(8).
34. Judge v. Pocius, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 142, 367 A.2d 788, 790 (1977) (footnotes
omitted).
A significant portion of the legislative debate focused upon the in pari materia ques-
tion. See, e.g., 1971 PA. H.R.J. at 2096. Although legislative debate is normally not an
important consideration in statutory construction, Commonwealth v. Alcoa Properties,
Inc., 440 Pa. 42, 269 A.2d 748 (1970), the support among the legislators for an in pari materia
construction was overwhelming. See also Op. PA. Arr'y GEN. No. 46 (1974) (Right-to-Know
and Sunshine Laws are in pari materia).
In addition to this comprehensive statutory scheme for open government, the Senate
and House of the Pennsylvania General Assembly have adopted Rules 36 and 14, which
require public disclosure of the legislature's expenditures including the purpose and the
recipient.
35. Swartley v. Harris, 351 Pa. 116, 118, 40 A.2d 409, 411 (1944). See also 2A D.
SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONsTRUcION 287 (4th ed. 1973).
36. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928 (Purdon 1977). See also Macurdy v. Staisey, 120
Pitts. L.J. 51, 53 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1972).
37. In Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 141 A.2d 844 (1958), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court dismissed considerations concerning the petitioner's interest in obtaining access to
the records in question. Moreover, the court declared that "the statutory language . . .
embraced all citizens and not simply those citizens who by some courts might be denied the
right of examination and inspection because of lack of interest or legitimate purpose." Id. at
350, 141 A.2d at 849. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
38. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
the public's right to inspect is uncertain. An analysis of the "agency"
definition of the statute reveals this uncertainty.
A. The Agency Requirement
Before.a citizen may assert his statutory right to inspect, he must
establish that the organization whose records he desires to inspect is an
"agency." The "Right to Know" statute, however, provides an unclear
and limited definition of "agency":
39
Any department, board or commission of the executive branch
of the Commonwealth, any political subdivision of the
Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, or
any State or municipal authority or similar organization created
by or pursuant to a statute which declares in substance that
such organization performs or has for its purpose the perform-
ance of an essential governmental function.40
Rarely has the "agency" definition been dispositive of an appeal
arising from a denial of access to public records. 4 1 In most instances this
element is stipulated by the parties. 42 When issues concerning the "agen-
cy" requirement have arisen, courts have generally acknowledged that
the definition was "intended to be as inclusive as possible." 43 Given a
legislative intent favoring open government, a uniform and inclusive
interpretation of the "agency" definition can be expected.
The "department, board or commission of the executive branch"
provision of the "agency" definition has been interpreted to include the
Governor." "It would be incongruous to conclude that each [executive]
Department must comply with the Right to Know Act but that the
ultimate repository of all executive authority does not have to comply."
4 5
39. The statutory definition of "agency" is significantly limited in comparison with
the general definition of the term: "agency" is "[a] subordinate creature of the sovereign
created to carry out a governmental function. Frequently a political subdivision or corpora-
tion." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 825 (4th ed. 1968). The "Right to Know" definition of
"agency" is also limited in comparison with the "agency" definition provided by the
"Sunshine" law. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text infra.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.110 (Purdon 1958).
41. Only two appeals from agency denials of requests to inspect have been dismissed
because the governmental unit was not an "agency." Burton v. Temple Univ. Law School,
18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 306, 335 A.2d 830 (1975); Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 4
Pa. Commw. Ct. 392, 285 A.2d 909, aff'd, 448 Pa. 424, 292 A.2d 395 (1972).
42. See, e.g., Moak v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 599, 336
A.2d 920 (1975) (parties stipulated that the Pennsylvania Department of Finance is an
agency).
43. Shapp v. Butera, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 238, 348 A.2d 910, 915 (1975).
44, Id.
45. Id. at 238, 348 A.2d at 915 (emphasis in original).
Several other departments, boards, or commissions have been expressly held to consti-
tute an "agency" under the statutory definition. Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct.
307, 373 A.2d 788 (1977) (Pennsylvania State Police); Mergenthaler v. Commonwealth State
Employees Retirement Bd., - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 372 A.2d 944 (1977); Butera v. Common-
wealth, Office of the Budget, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 343, 370 A.2d 1248 (1977); Friedman v.
Fumo, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 609, 309 A.2d 75 (1973) (Commission of Professional and
Occupational Affairs of the Department of State).
The meaning of the "political subdivision" provision of the defini-
tion is clarified by the Statutory Construction Act of 1977, 46 which
provides that the term includes "[a]ny county, city, borough, incor-
porated town, township, school district, vocational school district and
county institution district." 47 The "political subdivision" has been the
subject of the majority of case law interpretations of "agency." The
interpretations, however, have created a controversy about whether
school districts and educational facilities are included in the definition."
Although courts have agreed that counties and county governments are
within the scope of the "political subdivision" provision,49 they have
begun to rely on the "or similar organization" phrase of the "agency"
definition. 50
It is uncertain whether the "or similar organization" phrase of the
"agency" definition modifies its immediate precedent-"State or mu-
nicipal authorities" 51-- or the entire definition. Support for a more lim-
ited reading can be derived from decisions that have construed the
expansive phrase "or similar organization" in conjunction with the term
"State or municipal authorities. "52 Because no opportunity has been
presented for judicial interpretation of the phrase "or similar organiza-
tion" in relation to other elements of the "agency" definition, its mean-
ing remains unclear.
"Similar organization does not stand isolated in the definition."
53
All of the cases that have quoted the "agency" definition have separated
the phrase "or similar organization" from the preceding terms by the use
of italics.' This separation indicates that "or similar organization" is not
connected to a single preceding term, but modifies them all. Moreover, in
Kegel v. Community College of Beaver County, 55 the Beaver County
Court of Common Pleas noted that "college is not one of the depart-
ments, boards, commissions, subdivisions or authorities expressly men-
tioned in the statute. On the other hand it is clear that the college is
'similar' in some respects to such named organizations. "5 Apparent
46. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Purdon 1977).
47. Id.
48. Compare Niles v. Armstrong School Dist. 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 499 (C.P. Armstr.
1974) with Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 392, 285 A.22 909,
aff'd, 448 Pa. 424, 292 A.2d 395 (1972) and Kegel v. Community College of Beaver County,
55 Pa. D. & C.2d 220 (C.P. Beaver 1972).
49. See, e.g., Westmoreland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Montgomery, 14
Pa. Commw. Ct. 50, 321 A.2d 660 (1974).
50. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
51. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text infra.
52. See Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 392, 285 A.2d
909, aff'd, 448 Pa. 424, 292 A.2d 395 (1972); Kegel v. Community College of Beaver County,
55 Pa. D. & C.2d 220 (C.P. Beaver 1972).
53. Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 448 Pa. 424, 435, 292 A.2d 395, 401
(19720 (Manderino, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
54. Id.; Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 392, 394, 285
A.2d 909, 910 (1972), aff'd, 448 Pa. 424, 292 A.2d 395 (1972).
55. 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 220 (C.P. Beaver 1972).
56. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
from the language of the lower court is its acknowledgement that "similar
organization" modifies the entire "agency" definition."
The statutory definition of "agency" also includes "the Pennsylva-
nia Turnpike Commission" and "any State or municipal authority." The
Statutory Construction Act of 197758 defines "municipal authority" as
"[a] body corporate and politic created pursuant to the Municipality
Authorities Act of 1935 or to the Municipality Authorities Act of
1945.'' 59 In Levine v. Redevelopment Authority of New Castle,'° the
commonwealth court invoked the definition provided by the Munici-
palities Act of 1945 and concluded that the Redevelopment Authority was
an agency under the "Right to Know" statute. Therefore, the definition
provided by the Municipalities Act of 1945 may engender a broader
interpretation of the phrase "any State or municipal authority."
Once the preceding terms of the "agency" definition are under-
stood, the key clause of the definition may be considered-" or similar
organization created by. . . statute which declares in substance that such
organization performs . . . an essential governmental function.' '61 A
literal interpretation of this language would dictate that when a particular
enabling statute empowers an agency to perform essential governmental
functions the agency may be subject to the prescriptions of the "Right to
Know" statute. Courts, however, have emphasized the sources of agency
authority rather than the language of the particular enabling statute. In
Mooney v. Temple University Board of Trustees,62 for example, the
commonwealth court applied the clause to determine the agency status of
Temple University. Rather than consider the Temple University-
Commonwealth Act,63 the court emphasized the sources of University
trustee appointments and financial aid and held that "Temple's governing
and operating procedures statutorily preclude it from being an 'agency'
57. For additional reasoning in support of this contention, see notes 26-30 and 36 and
accompanying text supra.
58. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Purdon 1977).
59. The Municipalities Authority Act of 1945, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 301-322
(Purdon 1974), repealed the Municipalities Act of 1935. The authorities included under the
1935 Act, however, were also covered by the 1945 Act. Id. § 322. Moreover, the 1945 Act
provides a definition of "Municipal Authority" that is indirectly applicable to the "Right to
Know" statute. "The term. . . shall mean the body or board authorized by law to enact
ordinances or adopt resolutions for the particular municipality." Id. § 302(d).
A "municipal authority" is an independent agency of the Commonwealth and a part of
the sovereignty, Commonwealth v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Auth., 444 Pa. 345, 348, 281
A.2d 882, 884 (1971), and not an agent of the particular municipality creating it. East
Hempfield Twp. v. City of Lancaster, 62 Lanc. 175 (Pa. C.P. 1970).
60. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 382, 333 A.2d 190 (1975).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(1) (Purdon 1959). Two key phrases of this clause
have been interpreted. In Kegel v. Community College of Beaver County, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d
220 (C.P. Beaver 1972), the common pleas court noted that an "essential government
function" need not be expressly stated by the legislature in a statute and that "in sub-
stance" is defined as "having regard to essential elements; substantially; actually; really."
Id. at 223 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DCTIONARY COLLEGE EDrnos).
62. 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 392, 285 A.2d 909, aff'd, 448 Pa. 424, 292 A.2d 395 (1972).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2510-2(1) to 2510-2(12) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
under the Right to Know Act.' '6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the decision and also stressed Temple's operational sources,
although it referred briefly to the language of the enabling statute.
65
The Mooney courts deviated from the interpretation intended by the
legislature. 66 Rather than focusing on the definitional language and the
instruction articulated in the statute to consider the applicable enabling
act, the Mooney courts emphasized matters concerning state-relatedness
and, therefore, impliedly balanced governmental and public interests.
67
In contrast to the more limited "agency" definition contained in the
"Right to Know" statute, the "Sunshine" law68 includes within its
coverage the "General Assembly, or any State department, board, au-
thority or commission to include the governor's cabinet when meeting on
official policy making business.' '69 One explanation for the broader
coverage of the "Sunshine" law is that "a public hearing that an agency
conducts does not really open up the workings of that agency to public
scrutiny since a public hearing is basically an intake function. "70 No-
tably, however, all minutes of public meetings are considered public
records.
71
B. Public Record Requirement
After the "citizen" satisfies the "agency" requirement of the
"Right to Know" statute, he must establish that the information he seeks
is a public record. "The issue raised in most litigation concerning public
right of access is whether the document or information sought is covered
under the statutory definition of public record or is impliedly or expressly
exempted.' '72 The "Right to Know" statute defines "public record," in
pertinent part, as follows:
Any account, voucher or contract dealing with the receipt or
disbursement of funds by an agency or its acquisition, use or
disposal of services or of supplies, materials, equipment or
other property and any minute, order or decision by an agency
fixing the personal or property rights, privileges, immunities,
duties or obligations of any person or group of persons. 73
64. 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 394-95, 285 A.2d at 911.
65. 448 Pa. 424, 430, 292 A.2d 395, 398.
66. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
67. Justice Manderino, in his dissenting opinion, 448 Pa. at 436-37, 292 A.2d at 402,
advised the court of its deviation and advocated the definitional approach to interpreting the
"agency" definition.
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261-269 (Pardon Supp. 1977).
69. Id. § 261.
70. 1973 PA. H.R.J. at 1918.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 264 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
Minutes of public meetings become public records when they are "transcribed minutes,
in final form, [although] . . .awaiting only approval and placement in the Journal .... "
Conover v. Board of Educ. of Nebo School Dist., I Utah 375,-, 267 P.2d 768,770 (1954).
72. Comment, The Public's Right of Access to Government Information Under the
First Amendment, 42 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 164, 171 (1974).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Pardon 1959).
The "Right to Know" definition of public records is more limited than the common-law
definition. In Sheip & Co. v. Price, Page & Co., 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 6 (1896), the court
The definition of "public record" is divided into two segments. The
first segment (quoted above) constitutes a descriptive definition of a
"public record" and the second segment consists of "public record"
exceptions. Interpretations of the descriptive definition, which embrace
only the two words "account" and "minute," 74 have been uniform.
There is a judicial consensus that the term "public record" should
be liberally construed. 75 Courts have been unsuccessful in implementing
this construction, however, because they unconsciously apply the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius76 to the entire "public record"
provision of the statute. 77 This maxim requires an inference that all
omissions should be understood as exclusions "where a form of conduct,
the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things
to which it refers are designated . ". 8 .. The difficulty with the "Right
to Know" statute originates in the use of two lists or "designations": the
descriptive terms that constitute a "public record" and the "public
record" exceptions that immediately follow. The maxim should not be
applied to the "public record" definition as courts have occasionally
done, 79 but should only be applied to the "public record" exceptions to
fulfill the legislative desire for open government.80
The judiciary has employed a three-pronged test to determine
whether a requested item is, statutorily, a "public record." The court
initially considers whether the form of the record is sufficiently similar to
the "account, voucher, or contract" provision of the "public record"
definition. If not, then the court examines the function of the requested
document to determine whether it is a "minute, order or decision by an
agency fixing the personal or property rights, privileges, immunities,
defined "[a public] record as a written memorial made by a public officer authorized by law
to perform that function, and intended to serve as evidence of something written, said or
done." See also State v. Brantley, 271 P.2d 668, 672 (Or. 1954).
74. In Butera v. Commonwealth Office of the Budget, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 343, 370
A.2d 1248 (1977), the commonwealth court interpreted "account" to mean a "record of
debit and credit entries to cover transactions during a fiscal period of time and did not intend
[it]. . .to mean a statement of facts or events." Id. at 346, 370 A.2d at 1249. The word
'minute" is defined as a "brief written summary constituting the official record of the
proceedings of a meeting." West Shore School Dist. v. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 615,
619 n.5, 353 A.2d 93, 95 n.5 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 307, 373 A.2d 788 (1977);
Wiles v. Armstrong School Dist., 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 499 (C.P. Armstr. 1974).
76. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
692 (4th ed. 1968).
77. In West Shore School Dist. v.. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 615, 353 A.2d 93
(1976), the commonwealth court routinely applied the "public record" definition to the
particular personnel records sought by Homick. The court measured the record against each
term of the definition and concluded that the personnel records were not public because the
language of the statute did not include them. Moreover, since the definition did not
expressly provide for these types of records they were excluded from disclosure require-
ments because of the exemptions.
78. 2A D. SANDS, supra note 35, at 123 (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., West Shore School Dist. v. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 615, 353 A.2d
93 (1976).
80. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
duties or obligations of any person or group of persons ... ."81 Last,
the court may inquire whether, notwithstanding the qualification of a
record under either the form or function approach, the requested docu-
ment contains the type of information not intended by an agency to be the
subject of public examination.
The form analysis is derived from considerations involving the
descriptive language of the "public record" definition and it has been
frequently used by courts: "[m]ost of the recently decided cases deal with
this portion of the definition .... "82 The application of this approach,
however, has been limited to questions concerning whether records
constitute "accounts."83 The form method has been applied consistently
and, most significantly, it conforms with the legislative desire for
constructions based upon the clear language of the statute.
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The function method relies primarily upon the word "fixing,"
85
"the key word in . . . [the second] portion of the definition.''86 Al-
though the word has apparently been subjected to varied judicial interpre-
tations ,7 the commonwealth court has established a consistent approach
to determine whether anything has been "fixed," based upon verb
distinctions of the past, present, and future tenses. "Fixing" is said to
occur when "personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties
or obligations . . ." have already been affected88 or are most certain to
be affected.8 9 When the effect is merely speculative or is only a possibil-
ity nothing has been fixed. 90 Moreover, if compliance with the "minute,
order or decision" is voluntary, the applicable "rights, privileges, im-
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon 1959). This clause also implicitly recog-
nizes that the "Right to Know" statute must comply with procedural due process require-
ments. See notes 117-120 and accompanying text infra.
"Fixing" is defined as "decisions which establish, alter, abolish or deny rights,
privileges, immunities, duties or obligations; in short, decisions which affect them."
Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 307, 311, 373 A. 788, 790 (1977).
82. West Shore School Dist. v. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 615,618,353 A.2d 93,95
(1976).
83. See, e.g., Moak v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 599, 336
A.2d 920 (1975).
84. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 81 supra.
86. West Shore School Dist. v. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 615,619, 353 A.2d 93, 95
(1976).
87. Compare Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 307, 373 A.2d 788 (1977) with
Young v. Armstrong School Dist., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 203, 344 A.2d 738 (1975) and West
Shore School Dist. v. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 615, 353 A.2d 93 (1976).
88. Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 307, 373 A.2d 788 (1977) (dismissed
Pennsylvania State Policeman was granted access to his personal records to determine the
reasons for his removal).
89. Young v. Armstrong School Dist., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 203, 344 A.2d 738 (1975)
(school district was required to permit appellee to inspect a list that would be used to
determine school and class assignments of kindergarten students). See also Niles v. Arm-
strong School Dist., 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 499 (C.P. Armstr. 1974).
90. West Shore School Dist. v. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 615, 353 A.2d 93 (1976)
(school district was not required to permit a teacher to inspect his personnel records when
the teacher's concern was founded upon only the possibility of future Board proceedings).
munities, duties or obligations" have not been fixed. 91 Nevertheless, the
function method and, to a certain extent, the form method, have been
given varied interpretations because of the influence of the intent method.
In Mooney v. Temple University Board of Trustees' the common-
wealth court first considered whether the makers of records intended them
to be public. The court observed that "records of. . .private donations
were [not] meant to be the subject of public examination. 9 3 This method
was again applied in Butera v. Commonwealth Office of the Budget94
when the commonwealth court considered whether budget estimates
prepared by agencies were public records. 95 The appeal was dismissed,
but the court admitted that the records were conceivably within the
"public record" definition. 96 Implicit in the court's opinion was its
consideration whether the applicable agencies intended that the records
be open for public examination.
[W]e view. . . [the records]. . .as providing necessary infor-
mation to the Budget Secretary which will enable him to pre-
pare a more realistic State budget, rather than being accounts to
him by agencies relative to the receipt or disbursement of funds
or the use of services, materials [or] equipment . . .97
Under the influence of the intent method, therefore, courts have excluded
documents from the definition of "public record" that should otherwise
have been declared accessible.
Although it must be recognized that "[n]ot every document which
comes into possession or custody of a public official is a public
record,'"9s the restrictive interpretations imposed by the commonwealth
court are unwarranted. The legislature had intended to make accessible
records that were deemed "public" under the statutory definition. The
legislature imposed restrictions upon the right to inspect by deleting from
the original bill both the more inclusive language "or any other paper"
from the "account, voucher or contract" phrase and "or memorandum of
any," which was inserted between the language of the second clause,
"and any minute," and "order or decision by an agency fixing
... ," The judicial imposition of the intent method, therefore, was
not an expected restriction. 100
91. Shapp v. Butera, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 348 A.2d 910 (1975) (financial state-
ments voluntarily filed by the Governor's Cabinet and members of certain agencies pursuant
to an Executive Order were not public records).
92. 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 392, 285 A.2d 909 (1972).
93. Id. at 395, 285 A.2d at 911 (emphasis added).
94. 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 343, 370 A.2d 1248 (1977). Mr. Butera requested permission to
inspect agency budget estimates that contained information pertaining to revenues and
expenditures for the preceding years and for the current fiscal year.
95. Id. at 346, 370 A.2d at 1249.
96. Id. See note 74 supra.
97. 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 347, 370 A.2d at 1249.
98. Linder v. Eckard, 261 Ia. 216, -, 152 N.W.2d 833, 835 (1967). See also Tagliabue
v. North Bergen Twp., 9 N.J. 32, 86 A.2d 773 (1952).
99. See H. 800, Pennsylvania Gen. Ass., 1957-58 Session.
100. There are areas in which courts have applied a liberal construction. The areas,
C. The Exemptions
Assuming a citizen can establish that the information he seeks to
inspect is a public record and that the organization from which he seeks
this information is a public agency, he may nevertheless be denied access
to the record because of one of the following four statutory exceptions: 101
(1) records that consist of information of an investigation;0 2 (2) records
whose disclosure is statutorily prohibited; 10 3 (3) records that would harm
a person's reputation or personal security; ° and (4) records that would
cause a governmental unit to lose federal funds. 105 The statute, however,
expressly permits disclosure of two types of records that would otherwise
be exempt, "reports filed by agencies pertaining to safety and health in
industrial plants,"'' 0 6 and records of criminal convictions. 107
1. Investigations.-The investigation exemption is the provision
most frequently enacted in "freedom of information" statutes.108 Not
only does this exemption protect agency investigatory procedures from
disclosure,10 9 but it also dispels the potential harm that results from
disclosure of investigations based upon hearsay or "the opinion, conclu-
sion or judgment of the investigator .... "110 The "Right to Know"
statute provides the following investigation exemption: "[T]he term
'public records' shall not mean any report, communication or other
paper, the publication of which would disclose the institution, progress or
result of an investigation undertaken by an agency in the performance of
its official duties except . . . " III
however, are of little significance to the functions of government. See, e.g., Macurdy v.
Staisey, 120 Pitts. L.J. 51 (Pa. C.P. 1972) (documents registered on magnetic tapes are
considered public records and agencies cannot insulate records by the use of modern
technology).
101. The definition of "public record" is meant to be "read in conjunction with the
. . . four clear exceptions. ... McMullen v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 158, 308 A.2d
888, 894 (1973).
102. See notes 108-124 and accompanying text infra.
103. See notes 125-132 and accompanying text infra.
104. See notes 133-153 and accompanying text infra.
105. See notes 154-157 and accompanying text infra.
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977). See also Op. PA. A'Tr'y
GEN. No. 63 at 110 (1971).
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977). Furthermore, public records
relating to a criminal conviction are not accessible to the public because of their status as an
investigation report. Commonwealth v. Barclay, 47 Del. 203 (Pa. C.P. 1959).
108. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970); MD. CODE
ANN. art. 76A, § 3(b)(i) (1957); VA. CODE § 2.1-342(b)(2) (1973).
109. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Serv. Admin., 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974).
Concomitant with the desire to safeguard investigatory procedures is the governmental
interest in nondisclosure of investigation reports that will be the basis for further action.
City of Philadelphia v. Ruczynski, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 478 (C.P. Phila. 1961).
110. Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, -, 251 P.2d 893, 896 (1952).
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon 1959). The keyword of the exemption is
"investigation," which is defined as a "patient inquiry or observation;. . . to search into;
. . . to find out by careful inquisition .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 960 (4th ed. 1968).
"Result," a significant word in the second clause of the exemption, is defined as "a
The range of records included within the investigation exemption is
considerably broader than that of the "public record" definition. The
legislature undoubtedly intended to protect governmental interests in
nondisclosure to the fullest extent possible. Clear evidence of this inten-
tion is provided by the existence of "or other paper" in the exemption,
although the same phrase was deleted in the definition of "public
record. ''112
The majority of judicial interpretations of the exemption focus upon
whether granting access to records "would disclose the institution, prog-
ress or result of an investigation . . . ." In Wiley v. Woods,113 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court first considered the investigation exemption
and its relation to certain field investigation notes that were sought by
Wiley. The decision exempted the notes, but implied that the report made
from such notes was a public record." 4 "A distinction was posited,
therefore, stating that reports of final examinations are public records"
after all objections have been resolved, while the preliminary or "inves-
tigative" notesl 15 are exempt as "results." The distinction recognizes the
governmental interest of protecting records that would divulge agency
investigatory procedures and, therefore, limits the application of the
exemption to investigations that have been "instituted" or are in "prog-
ress" and to investigations when the "result" consists of matters other
than a report of "official actions taken by agencies or departments as a
result of investigations."''
116
The distinction between final and preliminary reports, moreover,
anticipates potential due process violations. 117 In the context of the
"Right to Know" statute, the exemptions could make certain records
inaccessible although "procedural due process requirements [could]...
make that same document available. '"I" The Wiley distinction, how-
conclusion or end to which any cause or condition of the thing leads, or which is obtained by
any process or operation; consequence or effect." Id. at 1478.
112. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
113. 393 Pa. 341, 141 A.2d 844 (1958). In Wiley, appellee brought a mandamus action to
compel the Planning Commission of the City of Pittsburgh to disclose certain field investiga-
tion notes allegedly used to deny her rezoning petition. The Commission had denied
appellee's request and the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County subsequently
entered an order granting the relief sought. The supreme court reversed the order.
114. Id. at352, 141 A.2dat850.SeealsoOp. PA. ATr'YGEN.No. 81at232n.1(1973).
115. OP. PA. Arr'v GEN. No. 81 at 232 n.1 (1973).
116. McMullen v. Wohlgemuth, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 183,185,282 A.2d 741,742, vacated
and remanded, 444 Pa. 563, 281 A.2d 836, reheard, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 574, 284 A.2d 334
(1971), rev'd on other grounds, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973).
117. The Wiley court discussed the requirements of procedural due process in relation
to the investigation exemption. Due process considerations, however, may also apply to any
of the other exemptions.
Although "[t]here is no general definition of procedural due process applicable to every
situation," Conestoga Nat'l Bank v. Patterson, 442 Pa. 289, 294, 275 A.2d 6, 8-9 (1971), the
two requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard are essential. See, e.g., Jordan v.
American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Commonwealth ex rel. Chidsey
v. Keystone Mutual Casualty Co., 373 Pa. 105, 95 A.2d 664 (1953).
118. Maryland State Police v. Renschen, 279 Md. 468,-, 369 A.2d 558, 561 (1977) (after
ever, restricts the exemption to records of investigations that are not used
for an "official action" and, therefore, are not subject to procedural due
process requirements.' 19 If the record, however, may be used in an
"official action" involving "personal or property rights, privileges,
immunities, duties or obligations," 120 due process and the Wiley distinc-
tion make them accessible to the public.
"The canons of statutory construction require that a statute be read
in a manner which will effectuate its purpose, a task which compels
consideration of more than the statute's literal words." 121 Although their
focus upon the descriptive language of the investigative exemption to the
right of access has been limited, Pennsylvania courts have faithfully
interpreted this exemption to achieve the legislative intent of open gov-
ernment. 122 The exemption was "not designed to prohibit dissemination
of a result of investigation the very purpose of which is to acquire
information for the use of the public."1 23 As a result, courts are arguing
on the principle that "once an investigation is concluded and the file
closed, either with or without prosecution by the state, such public
records in most instances should be available for public inspection." 1
24
2. Disclosure Forbidden by Statute or Court Order or Decree. -
The statutory provision exempting "any record, document, material,
exhibit, pleading, report, memorandum or other paper, access to or the
publication of which is prohibited, restricted or forbidden by statute law
or order or decree of court" 125 is a remnant from the common law. 126 The
provision, however, has rarely controlled the outcome of a decision.
1 27
an initial refusal, Renschen was granted access to records that were used by appellant in a
handgun license revocation hearing).
119. Due process requirements are not applicable to purely investigative or legislative
actions. See Smith v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 192 Pa. Super. Ct. 424, 162 A.2d
80 (1960). The requirements are imposed "where the administrative action is adjudicatory in
nature and involves substantial property rights." See Conestoga Nat'l Bank v. Patterson,
442 Pa. 289, 296, 275 A.2d 6, 9 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Chidsey v. Mallen, 360 Pa.
606, 63 A.2d 49 (1949).
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977). This clause of the "public
record" definition has not yet been judicially construed, although two commonwealth court
cases indicate its probable interpretation. In Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 307,
311, 373 A.2d 788, 790 (1977), the court held that "an enforceable expectancy in
[appellant's] continued public employment" is a property right. In Young v. Armstrong
School Dist., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 203, 344 A.2d 738 (1975), the court decided that a list of
kindergarten pupils' names and addresses that was to be used to schedule class days
"fixed" the parents' "duties or obligations."
121. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 166-
67, 233 A.2d 290, 295 (1967).
122. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
123. OP. PA. ATrr'y GEN. No. 81 at 230 (1973).
124. Houston v. Rutledge, 237 Ga. 764, -, 229 S.E.2d 624,626 (1976) (emphasis added).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., In re North American's Application, 40 Pa. C. 649, 652 (Alty. Gen.
1913).
127. Although an exhaustive list of statutes that forbid the disclosure of records is
prohibitive, a limited list may be useful. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-344 (Purdon
Supp. 1977) (juvenile court records may be disclosed on a limited basis; id. § 2215
The legislature intended that this exemption be applied to a variety
of records, which is evidenced by use of the encompassing term "or other
paper." Since the governmental interests safeguarded by the provision
are not apparent from the language of the exemption, they must be
ascertained from the various statutes that make the exemptions applica-
ble. 12
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The federal "Freedom of Information Act' ' t 29 includes a provision
similar to this exemption but imposes additional qualifications that deter-
mine the applicability of each statute. The qualifications require that each
statute eliminate discretion from decisions whether records should be
withheld from public access or "establish particular criteria for withhold-
ing [records] or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld
... 9"
1 3 0 The omission of similar provisions in the Pennsylvania statute
leaves "the question of public access to the virtually unbridled discre-
tion" of the agencies.' 3 ' Therefore, if the exemption is to fulfill its
intended purpose, statutes, orders, or decrees that are included in the
exemption must "clearly identify some class of documents to be kept
confidential or, at the very least, prescribe specific standards by which an
administrative agency can determine the propriety of disclosure."
132
3. Personal Security Exemption.-The "Right to Know" statute
exempts records "which would operate to the prejudice or impairment of
a person's reputation or personal security .... ,,133 Pennsylvania
courts refuse to equate this exemption with the "invasion of privacy"
provision that exists in the Freedom of Information Act 34 and in statutes
of other states.1 35 "[Flor us to equate a concept of privacy with the
(disclosure of reports of child abuse is forbidden); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.15 (Purdon
1977) (records of disease maintained by state and local health authorities may not be publicly
disclosed); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1192 (Purdon 1971) (insurance commission records of
examinations of certain organizations are not open to public inspection in certain cases); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 404 (Purdon Supp. 1977) (welfare assistance records are accessible to
the public unless sought for commercial or political purposes); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 435
(Purdon 1968) (real estate broker's commission records may not be disclosed unless the
Commission declares them public).
Although court orders or decrees have never been the subject of judicial review, they
can forbid disclosure of public records as effectively as statutes. The significant difference
in the application of a court order or decree, however, is that they are issued after an in
camera proceeding. Presumably, courts in deciding the propriety of disclosure would weigh
the competing interests of public disclosure and governmental secrecy. This may circum-
vent the role of the legislature and subject the public's right to inspect to judicial balancing
in contravention of the legislative intent to provide a definitional 'Right to Know" statute.
See notes 4-8 and accompanying text supra.
128. See note 127 supra.
129. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1977).
130. Id. § 552(b)(3).
131. Cutler v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 375 F. Supp. 722, 724 (D.D.C. 1974).
132. Id.
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
134. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (1977).
135. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19(b) (West Supp. 1978); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 4.1801(l)(a) (1977).
concept of 'personal security' would usurp the legislative prerogative of
the General Assembly. . . . The concept of personal security . .
involves protection from personal harm rather than protection from an
invasion of privacy." 136 The proper interpretation of personal security is
"a state of freedom from harm, danger, fear or anxiety,-a state not
affected by another's knowledge of one's illness or bereavement."
137
The comparison approach originally employed by courts to deter-
mine the propriety of disclosure was formulated in McMullan v. Wohl-
gemuth. 38 The commonwealth court in McMullan permitted access to
public records containing the names and addresses of welfare recipients
and the amounts of assistance received by each. Although the decision
was reversed on appeal pursuant to the "forbidden by statute" exemp-
tion, it established the extent of disclosure of records permissible before
harm would be caused to a person's reputation or security. 139 Courts have
abandoned this comparison approach in favor of a structural approach
based upon the language of the exemption. 
140
The most important phase of the personal security exemption,
"would operate," forms the basis for contentions favoring nondisclosure
that are predicated upon an interpretation that "consider[s] the possible
ways in which facially harmless records might be employed so as to
impair reputations .... 141 Courts have uniformly rejected these
contentions in favor of the more restrictive "intrinsically harmful"
theory, which attempts to eliminate potential abuses of discretion by
concentrating upon probable direct results of disclosure. As a result,
fewer impairments of personal security or reputation are recognized,
which permits more frequent disclosure.
In Moak v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 42 the commonwealth
court rejected arguments that the disclosure of police department payroll
136. Young v. Armstrong School Dist., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 203,207, 344 A.2d 738,740
(1975).
137. Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 495, 500, 329 A.2d 307, 310 (1974)
(access to teacher's attendance record cards was permitted despite the possibility that a
disciplinary action against that teacher might be revealed).
138. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 574, 284 A.2d 334 (1971), rev'don other grounds, 453 Pa. 147,
308 A.2d 888 (1973).
139. Courts in two cases have reached their determinations by making comparisons to
the lower court's holding in the McMullen case. In Friedman v. Fumo, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct.
609, 309 A.2d 75 (1973), the plaintiff was permitted to inspect the lists of persons who took
an accountancy examination to compare them with the successful candidate's list that was
published in the newspaper. The court in Kegel v. Community College, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 220
(C.P. Beaver 1972), found that disclosure of individual salary records of college employees
would be no more harmful than the disclosure of welfare lists.
140. Presumably, a major reason for courts' departure from the comparison approach
of McMullen was the supreme court's disapproval of that approach on appeal. Rather than
invoke this approach, the court noted that "exceptions (1) [investigative exception] and (3)
[reputation and personal security exception] are equally persuasive in foreclosing appellees'
contentions." 453 Pa. at 160 n.8, 308 A.2d at 895 n.8.
141. Moak v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 599, 604, 336 A.2d
920, 923 (1975).
142. Id.
records would enable the press to discover the identities of police officers
accused of improprieties 14 3 and, therefore, harm their reputations or
impair their personal security. Although it admitted that mere disclosure
of the payroll records would not be detrimental, the city asserted that the
"personal security" exemption was applicable and thus implicitly argued
for an interpretation that would replace "would operate" with "could
operate." The court, in dismissing the appeal, noted that if "the Legisla-
ture. . . intended to except records intrinsically harmless but capable of
being used with other materials in a manner harmful to reputation, [it]
would have chosen less restrictive phraseology than 'would operate.' "144
The application of the language "would operate" has been uniformly
interpreted as "in and of itself" 14 5 or "intrinsically harmful,"146 while
the less restrictive phrase, "could operate," has been overwhelmingly
rejected. 1
47
Although the exemption has consistently been interpreted restrictive-
ly to provide more frequent disclosures, confusion has arisen when
records consist of both accessible and exempted data. Courts have re-
sponded to such situations by distinguishing between records that are
"routine" and those that are "confidential." 148 A record that is ordinar-
ily considered routine, but presently includes exemptable data would
most probably be disclosed 149 while a record that is ordinarily confiden-
tial would remain secret. 50
The interpretations of the "personal security" exemption have been
uniform and consistent with the definitional approach of the "Right to
Know" statute. 15 ' The exemption, however, is susceptible to an arbitrary
rule of reason and to a judicial balancing of competing interests. "In
short, [courts may find that] there [are] . . . '[r]evelations . . . so
143. The payroll records contained social security numbers and officers' names and
could have been used by the press for a comparison with a recently published Crime
Commission report that had listed only the social security numbers of violating officers. Id.
at 604, 336 A.2d at 922-23.
144. Id. at 604, 336 A.2d at 923 (emphasis added).
145. Wiles v. Armstrong School Dist., 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 499, 503 (C.P. Armstr. 1974)
(plaintiffs were granted access to school records that consisted of a list of pupils despite the
defendant's contention that disclosure would result in harassment and jeopardize pupils'
personal security).
146. Friedman v. Fumo, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 609, 611, 309 A.2d 75, 76 (1973).
147. Mergenthaler v. Commonwealth State Employee's Retirement Bd., - Pa.
Commw. Ct. -, 372 A.2d 944, 947 (1977) (appellee's records, which included a list of
retired state employees, were accessible and did not constitute records exempt under the
personal reputation and security provision).
148. The present interjection of an "intent" factor is not as troublesome as it would be
in the definition of "public record." See notes 92-97 and accompanying text supra. Rather,
this standard evolved from purely administrative concerns for cost. Because cost may
prohibit public access, evaluation of reasons for placing certain data on records may be
necessary if such action is designed to discourage disclosure.
149. See, e.g., Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 495, 501, 329 A.2d 307, 310
(1974).
150. See, e.g., Mergenthaler v. Commonwealth State Employee's Retirement Bd., -
Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 372 A.2d 944, 948 (1977).
151. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
intimate and so unwarranted . . . as to outrage the community's notions
of decency. '"152 Nevertheless, courts must follow the foremost principle
that "privacy and confidentiality, as distinguished from regard for reputa-
tion and personal security, must yield to the public's right to know
"1153
4. Loss of Federal Funds.-The fourth exception to the "public
record" definition embraces documents "which would result in the loss
by the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions or commissions
or State or municipal authorities of Federal funds.' Although the
exemption has never formed the basis of an opinion, the commonwealth
court in McMullen v. Wohlgemut'" briefly mentioned its possible appli-
cation. The court, referring to the Jenner Amendment to the Revenue
Act, 5 6 found the receipt of federal funds was not in jeopardy.' 5 7
D. Rules Governing the Inspection and Copying of Records
The Pennsylvania "Right to Know" statute includes a provision'
58
that authorizes custodians of documents to promulgate rules and regula-
tions 159 to govern the inspection and copying of public records:
Any citizen . . . shall have the right to take extracts or make
copies of public records and to make photographs or photostats
of the same while such records are in the possession, custody
and control of the lawful custodian thereof or his authorized
deputy. The lawful custodian of such records shall have the
right to adopt and enforce reasonable rules governing the mak-
ing of such extracts, copies, photographs or photostats.16°
The section which is intended to guard against the loss or destruction of
records and to avoid the unreasonable disruption of the functioning of the
office where they are maintained, 16 1 "does not distinguish between the
right to inspect and the right to copy."'
' 62
Although rules may be adopted that restrict an individual's mono-
polization of records so that the right to inspect and copy can be guaran-
152. Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 6 Conn. Cir. 633, -, 294 A.2d 646, 648 (1971)
(quoting Sidis v. F-R Pub'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1949)).
153. Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 495, 500, 329 A.2d 307, 310 (1974).
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977). Much of the language of this
exemption is identical to that of other provisions in the statute. Therefore, interpretations of
these other provisions should be consulted. See notes 46, 59-60 and accompanying text
supra.
155. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 574, 284 A.2d 334 (1971).
156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1306a (1977).
157. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 579, 284 A.2d at 336.
158. The provision is a remnant of the common law. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel.
Biddle v. Walton, 6 Pa. D. 287 (C.P. Phila. 1897).
159. Rules promulgated to govern the inspection and copying of public records have
the force and effect of law. Good v. Wohlgemuth, 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. 524, 327 A.2d 397
(1974).
160. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.3 (Purdon 1959).
161. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Eagen v. Dunmore Borough School Directors,
343 Pa. 440, 443, 23 A.2d 468, 470 (1942).
162. City of Philadelphia v. Ruczynski, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 478, 481 (C.P. Phila. 1961).
teed to all, 163 rules that restrict the right of access must be necessary and
reasonable. The most frequently adopted agency regulation requires that
requests for inspection be timely made. 64 If the request is timely the
"citizen" must be given an opportunity to inspect and copy the records
before an agency undertakes official action. 165 Moreover, the expense of
copying public records, may be imposed on the "citizen." 1" Finally,
access to public records must be pursuant to "a reasonable request for
identifiable records [and not] . . . a broad, sweeping, indiscriminate
request for production lacking any specificity." 167 If a proper request has
been made an agency can excuse its failure to produce a "public record"
only by a reasonable account for its unavailability.
168
The accessibility of public records to the people of Pennsylvania
depends, in large part, upon the effective operation of the inspection
provision. 169 Although the statutory definitions of "public record" and
''agency" may require disclosure, agencies can limit access by adopting
unreasonable rules or by failing to adopt rules at all. In City of Philadel-
phia v. Ruczynski,' 70 for example, the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County dealt with the Philadelphia Police Department's
failure to adopt rules governing public access to accident investigation
reports. The court ordered the police department to permit Ruczynski to
inspect the records, stating, "[The] Department of Records has no legal
right to make ad hoc, and perhaps variable, determinations and limita-
tions under which . . . reports may be inspected and copied." 71 Be-
cause too few refusals of public requests for access to records are
appealed, however, it is impossible to ascertain the extent to which
agencies comply with this section.
E. Jurisdiction
"Although the Act does not specifically set forth procedural require-
ments, [the jurisdiction] section . . . provides for judicial review of
'agency' decisions.' ' 72 The jurisdiction provision, which gives citizens
163. Direct Mail Serv. Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 296 Mass. 353, -, 5 N.E.2d
545, 547 (1937).
164. First Nat'l Bank of Pike County v. Department of Banking, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct.
603, 607-08, 300 A.2d 823, 825 (1973).
165. See, e.g., Condon v. Dallastown Area School Dist., 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 200 (C.P.
York 1974).
166. Friedman v. Fumo, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 609, 612, 309 A.2d 75, 76 (1973).
167. Irons v. Schuyler, 321 F. Supp. 628, 629 (D.D.C. 1970).
168. August v. Lower Saucon Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 785, 788
(C.P. Northam. 1973).
169. A liberal tendency is already evident in the cases dealing with magnetic tapes and
discs and other modern recording devices. Macurdy v. Staisey, 120 Pitts. L.J. 51 (Pa. C.P.
Alleg. 1972).
170. 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 478 (C.P. Phila. 1961).
171. Id. at 481. The court also required the Department of Records to provide an
administrative hearing to consider whether access should be granted. The court wanted to
obtain a record of the hearing so that "upon a writ of certiorari, such record would be
certified to a Court of Common Pleas." Md. at 482.
172. Shapp v. Butera, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 230-31, 348 A.2d 910, 911 (1975).
an exclusive remedy when an agency has wrongfully withheld records
from public inspection, 73 states,
Any citizen . . .denied any right granted to him . . .may
appeal from such denial to the Commonwealth Court if an
agency of the Commonwealth is involved, or to the court of
common pleas of the appropriate judicial district if a political
subdivision or any agency thereof. If such court determines that
such denial was not for just and proper cause under the terms of
this act, it may enter such order for disclosure as it may deem
proper. 174
"The concept of jurisdiction is designed to insure the availability of
the most practical and competent forum for the airing of a particular
grievance."' 7 5 In implementing this principle, courts have uniformly
focused upon whether the activities performed by the agency may be
characterized as local or statewide concerns. 1 76 As a result, courts have
avoided the "absurd and unreasonable result that a citizen would be
required to pursue his right to gain access to information in Harrisburg
even though the records were located in the community and the agency
involved had been created by an individual city or county and the issues
involved were matters strictly within the concern of a particular locality
rather than a concern of the Commonwealth generally."
177
The jurisdictional aspects of the "Right to Know" statute, therefore,
are complete and effective. The judicial focus upon the activity per-
formed by the "agency" and its geographical location facilitates quick
disposition of controversies. Moreover, litigation arising from appeals is
conducted in a manner that causes the citizen the least possible inconveni-
ence.
IV. Inadequacies of the "Right to Know" Statute
Although the Pennsylvania "Right to Know" statute provides an
explicit guideline for determining when the public may inspect and copy
records, the statute suffers from several inadequacies. The most serious
inadequacy is the lack of a penalty provision. Thus, no deterrent prevents
public officials from bowing to the pressures of convenience by making
public records inaccessible.
The bill originally introduced in the Pennsylvania House of Repre-
173. Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 141 A.2d 844 (1958).
174. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.4 (Purdon 1959) as amended by the Act of July 31,
1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, Art. V, § 508, codified at PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 211.508(a)(90)
(Purdon Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
175. Scott v. Shapiro, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 479, 483, 339 A.2d 597, 599 (1975).
176. Compare Young v. Armstrong School Dist., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 203,344 A.2d 738
(1975) (school district is a local concern) and Moak v. Philadelphia News, Inc., 18 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 599, 336 A.2d 920 (1975) (Philadelphia Police Department is a local concern)
with Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 307, 373 A.2d 788 (1977) (State Police is a
statewide concern) and Mergenthaler v. Commonwealth State Employee's Retirement Bd.,
- Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 372 A.2d 944 (1977) (State Employees Retirement Board is a statewide
concern).
177. Levine v. Redev. Auth., 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 382, 386, 333 A.2d 190, 192 (1975)
(footnotes omitted).
sentatives included a penalty section,178 which was deleted by the House
State Government Committee. 179 Compliance with the statute, therefore,
depends upon the good faith of the agencies or upon the issuance of court
orders or decrees requiring disclosure. The public justifiably lacks confi-
dence in the good faith of the agencies, 8 0 and the high cost of litigation
makes the need for a court order or decree requiring disclosure equally
unattractive. The enactment of a penalty provision is, therefore, neces-
sary to insure open government.' 81
The statute is also inadequate because the "agency requirement"'
182
does not include the Pennsylvania General Assembly. 83 Though both the
Senate and the House have adopted resolutions that require disclosure of
records of expenditures, 8 4 the public should also be granted the right to
inspect, for example, committee reports and legislative bill analyses. '85 If
the public is to scrutinize the functions of its government, the lawmakers
who enacted the "Right to Know" statute must divulge their own records
as well.
V. Conclusion
The Pennsylvania "Right to Know" statute has generally been
construed in accordance with the legislative intent. 186 Although judicial
balancing of governmental and public interests has interceded in the
application of several provisions of the statute and courts have occasion-
ally considered irrelevant matters, decisions that interpret the "Right to
Know" statute have generally been both uniform and consistent. Strict
adherence to the definitional approach of the statute should remove from
the courts the need to balance governmental interests against the public's
right to know. The statute, however, demonstrates that not every con-
178. See Pa. R. 800 (Printer's No. 368), 1957-58 Session.
179. See Pa. R. 800 (Printer's No. 831), 1957-58 Session.
180. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
181. A penalty provision can assume any one of a number of forms. It can provide
criminal sanctions, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 68 A.2-9 (West 1973), or civil sanctions, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 147 (1958), and can remedy the damaging effects of nondisclosure by
imposing penalties of imprisonment, e.g., ARK. STAT ANN. § 12-2807 (Supp. 1977), fines;
e.g., TEX. Civ. CODE ANN. tit. 17 1/2, § 6252-17a(12) (Vernon Supp. 1978), and costs, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 39-121.02 (1974), or by awarding pecuniary damages, id. Criminal
sanctions provide the greatest deterrent to unjustified nondisclosure, but require proof of
willful and intentional misconduct. Thus, negligence or a misunderstanding of the provisions
of the statute will not expose custodians to criminal liability. The burden of proof, however,
falls upon the custodian to demonstrate that the nondisclosure resulted from negligence or
misunderstanding.
182. See notes 39-71 and accompanying text supra.
183. Cf. notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra. An amendment to the "Right to
Know" statute that extends the "agency" definition to include the General Assembly has
recently been approved by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives by a unanimous
vote. See R. 604 (Printer's No. 2681), 1977-78 Sess. ("agency" definition includes the
General Assembly and the judiciary).
184. See note 34 supra.
185. These types of disclosures will foster a more knowledgeable electorate. See note 3
supra.
186. See notes 4-8 and accompanying text supra.
sideration necessary for a fair decision can be reduced to words. Neces-
sary additions and deletions to the provisions of the statute that corre-
spond to the particular needs of Pennsylvania citizens would most appro-
priately be provided by the General Assembly as the need arises.
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